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Abstract: This paper is analyzing a dynamic evolutionary game of firm-bank
interaction to underline the importance of the interaction regime for encouraging or
discouraging soft-budget phenomena and financial disorder. The poor performance of
public sector's firms, which led globally to quests for the contraction of that sector and
privatizations, is viewed as an equilibrium situation, ascribed to the inadequate
attention of policy to the interaction regime. Moreover, it is found out that the
background of the transition economies is such as to require even at equilibrium, a
regime fostering much stricter financial discipline than in the mixed economies.
Finally, it is argued that the abandonment of central planning was a necessary
condition, a prerequisite, for the removal of its softness.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Much has been written about the "'soft budget constraint'" problem since
Kornai's (1979, 1980, 1986) seminal work on the subject. Such a problem is given rise
by the inability of (mainly state) banks to turn down the financing of a (public
company's) bad project once some investment costs have been sunk. It is a problem
which usually occurs in central planning and has been held responsible for many
decadent phenomena under that economic system; phenomena ranging from thousands
of soft prices and taxes to corruption. According to Kornai (1992, 1993), such a problem
is only part of a more general mentality of softness and lack of discipline, other than
that imposed by compulsion, prevailing in central planning. The reason is the
supremacy of the (communist) party and the state in deciding the "solutions"' to the
economy's incentive problems, in deciding really the fate of everything, thus turning
everything into a political matter.
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Nevertheless, a variant of the soft-budget-constraint problem is present in
mixed economies too, insofar as public enterprises are concerned, before privatization
reforms. As a matter of fact, it will be argued later that these reforms and movements
to limit the size of the public sector in mixed economies were acts intended to solve this
problem. It is common knowledge that public corporations become less attentive to
their finances by comparison with private businesses, either purposefully, being used as
a policy instrument, or just because being public is taken to imply impossibility of
bankruptcy.1 They are entities as huge as the corporations of central planning and
hence have large sunk costs that, as e.g. Qian and Xu (1993) show, make all projects,
good or bad, worthwhile once some of them have been undertaken.
Moreover, we are all aware of Niskanen's (1971, 1973) and Tullock's (1976)
theory of bureaucracy, which states that the goal of the bureaucrats of a bureau is to
maximize the bureau's budget rather than bureau efficiency, because they have no
property rights on the gains from attaining the latter target but enjoy prestige, power,
perquisites, even fiddles, from pursuing the former goal. Bureaucracy is thus prone to
overstate the benefits of a project and understate the costs, to manipulate a budget in
line with its preferences, etc, without much care for "mistakes", as their costs are borne
by the public. Now, as soon as a public company is a bureau, it is not difficult to see
that the adoption of a bad project may very likely be intentional and not just an
unfortunate event.
In this paper, we do not differentiate analytically between private and public
firms, but when we elaborate on the real-world relevance of our results, softness is
attributed to the enterprises of the public sector. The analysis consists of an application
of dynamic evolutionary game theory, as this theory is presented, for instance, by Vega-
Redondo (1996). The next section spells out the basic model and establishes the result
that softness will be the only stable long-run equilibrium if banks are unable to make a
credible commitment to refuse the refinancing of a bad project. This is the case of
centrally planned economies. A "mixed-economy equilibrium" emerges, too, but is found
to be unstable in the sense that certain firms (public ones) may view banks' toleration
of some loan defaulting as a sign of soft loan tolerance, and proceed with requests for
such loans. Section 3 introduces into the basic analytical framework the element of the
firm-bank interaction regime, and shows how the appropriate manipulation of this
regime by policymakers may promote a healthy financial environment in connection
with both transition as well as mixed economies. The paper concludes with further
thoughts on the subject under investigation.
2. THE SOFT-BUDGET AS AN EQUILIBRIUM PHENOMENON
In what follows, a formal dynamic treatment of softness is advanced. Suppose
that if ever a firm wanted a loan, it would like it to be a "soft-budget loan". Also, all
                                                          
1 This might have been a symptom of the concessions of post-war capitalism to socialism (welfare
state).
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firms can advance a hard-budget loan request, but only a percentage 1f  of them
conduct healthy business and can cope with such a loan successfully. A hard loan
request is always welcomed by banks, which are known to approve soft loan
applications, too, with a probability no larger than p, but the percentage of banks that
actually does so is 1b . Hence, the firm-bank population profile is )},(),,{( 2121 bbffh = ,
where 12 1 ff −=  and 12 1 bb −= , since we are dealing with percentages. Thus, a loan
request involves a game whose one component is the normal-form game described by
Table 1. The strategy combination "Soft-Approve" yields a higher payoff to the firm and
a lower one to the bank by comparison with the case "Hard-Approve": G>C, S<Y. Of
course, a bank can never monitor a firm perfectly while the payoffs under rejection are
nil to both parties. Nevertheless, a hard loan request will never be rejected and this is
why the payoff associated with "Hard-Reject" is C, Y as well. The unique solution to the
game of Table 1 is "Soft-Approve", but note that the whole game involves in addition
the mixed strategy of "approving soft with probability p at most ". Moreover, what
would be of interest is how the game described above affects the intertemporal behavior
of the population profile.
Table 1: A normal-form game of firm-bank interaction
Bank
Approve Reject
Hard C, Y C, Y
Firm
Soft G, S 0, 0
In other words, our complete game is a dynamic evolutionary one, with the
following replicator dynamics:
))(( 1111 1 GbCfff −−=! (1)
))(( 1111 11 bfSbb −−=! (2)
where all variables are functions of time, which is deleted for simplicity, and the dot (ñ)
denotes time derivative.2 These dynamics are depicted in Fig. 1, in which all
trajectories converge to the population state )},(),,{(* 0110 2121 ===== bbffh  that is
also asymptotically stable. Trajectories that are not attracted by *h  must converge to
the set Φ whose boundary is )},(),,{( pbpbff −==== 101 2121 . Outside this set the
configuration "Soft-Approve" continues to be the equilibrium state even in the long-run
                                                          
2 All expressions in the text are in their final form, i.e. after all manipulations. To rationalize
replicator dynamics note that (1), for instance, is a rearrangement of the expression
)]}([{ 111111 fGbCfCff −+−=
! , which says that the change of healthy enterprises over time
depends on the percentage of such firms at any instant multiplied by deviation of the certain
payoff, C, from the expected one in case a bank approving soft loans happens to be found.
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and despite the presence of the mixed strategy. This is a very important conclusion
which will be evaluated in the light of an appreciation of Φ  as well. The set Φ  means
technically that the percentage 1b  becomes over time equal to that expected. In view of
11 =f , however, 1b  and p should be reinterpreted as reflecting the amount of loan-
default risk banks are willing to take, i.e. as part of normal bank behavior, since there
are no soft loan requests. Recall that not all firms are healthy enough to handle a hard
loan, though they can apply for one. Based then on real-world experience, which
condemns softness, we may safely assert that the set Φ  describes a more prudent state
of affairs than *h .
This is perhaps why all states in Φ  are asymptotically unstable. A "default-
risk mentality" on the part of banks cannot survive, because its existence and only
tempts firms to default by requesting and getting soft loans. This mentality of banks
simply lends itself to circumvention by making borrowers reason that banks are
prepared to confront any state of the world in the sense of being able to bear the costs
even of softness. In fact, such would be the interpretation of bank behavior under an
assessment of Φ  advanced by drawing an analogy with classical (nonevolutionary)
game theory. It thus appears that widespread softness is inescapable. It is not strange
then that it became the sine qua non of public corporations, as a modus vivendi, i.e. as
an equilibrium state like *h , under central planning, and as the aftermath of
bureaucracy's improper dealings with banks, i.e. as a destabilizing factor resembling
that in Φ , in mixed economies. Presumably Φ  is more like a "mixed-economy
equilibrium".
Figure 1: The dynamics of the basic model
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To gain more insight, let us examine more closely the nature of the game's
mixed strategy. Such a strategy introduces an element of uncertainty, namely the
prospect of having a soft loan request turned down. In view also of the element of time,
this prospect is equivalent to a punishment threat that should elicit healthy
collaboration in the long-run as it happens with the single-population case of the
repeated prisoner's dilemma model. But, in our case, the threat seems to be noncredible
within the set Φ or to be eliminated during the course towards *h . Indeed, central
planning removed all obstacles to softness while credit controls to public companies in
mixed economies are, to put it mildly, relaxed. One reason for the disappointing
performance of these companies that adversely affected overall economic activity was
precisely this situation. The subsequent world-wide quests and steps for privatization
and for the contraction of the public sector were really moves purporting to change the
(public) firm-bank interaction regime so as to "correct things" by restoring the
credibility of the threat of punishment for borrowing soft.
In terms of our modeling, these considerations imply that modifications should
be made to take into account that interaction regime. An examination of a perturbed
game is called for, in which behavior is altered by the regime governing the interaction
among the concerned parties. The perturbation refers, of course, to the dynamics given
by (1) and (2), but only to the extent that behavior in Φ  is concerned, since it can have
no qualitative effect elsewhere in the system. At the one end, the interaction regime
may be influencing only firms' attitude by discouraging them explicitly or implicitly
from putting forward soft loan requests. At the other end, the influence may be only on
banks by encouraging them to increase the rejection rate. It is thus straightforward
that the dynamics of the perturbed model is a sensitive issue, depending on the rates of
behavior alteration characterizing each population.
3. THE WOULD-BE DYNAMICS OF THE TRANSITION
ECONOMIES
We shall now show how the appropriate manipulation of the firm-bank
interaction regime may promote a healthy financial environment in connection not
only with transition but also with mixed economies.
Let the rate at which the interaction regime alters firm behavior be 10 << fm
while the rate corresponding to bank behavior alteration is assumed to be 10 << bm .
These rates capture the extent to which the regime discourages firms from borrowing
soft and banks from approving soft loans. To start the analysis, assume a "neutral"
regime and a disorientation of firms and banks, inducing them to adopt initially their
available strategies with equal probability.3 The replicator dynamics thus become
                                                          
3 This is, of course, a hypothetical situation, serving only as a starting point for our discussion.
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Setting 11 0 bf
!!
==  to find the rest points of the perturbed system, yields
))(()()( 1111 112
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Taking the ratio of the two last expressions, one obtains that
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Since we are interested in the set Φ , we let 11 →f  and hence, this ratio becomes
)(
))((
11
11
1
21
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w
−−
−−
=
We wish to study whether the original system's dynamics change even when
the m's are very small. Consequently, we should also let 0→fm  and 0→bm  so as to
keep the ratio wmmmm fbbf =−− )]}(/[)]({[ 11  constant at some benchmark value with
respect to the types of the solutions of (7) for 1b .4 This value turns out to be
SCGCGw /])([ −+= 2 (8)
since at that value we have
)(
)(
CGCG
CGCC
b
−−
−−
±=
2
1 (9)
the positive (negative) sign requiring 2C > G (2C<G) for (9) to be positive. When 2C <
G, it can be checked that (7) cannot exceed the critical value of w, because it would
imply that for 1b  to be positive, the positive sign should hold, and this is the case when
2C > G rather than the opposite. Therefore, when 2C < G, (7) should be less than the
w given by (8), thus giving two solutions, which for stability reasons also, should satisfy
pb
G
CGCGCG
b
G
CCGCG
=<′′<
−−−+
≤<
−−−
2
1
33 1
2
1
2 )()(
(10a)
                                                          
4 This approach is based on Gale et al. (1995).
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By the same line of reasoning, if 2C > G (7) has well-defined solutions when it is less
than (8), it yields two solutions, satisfying
pb
GC
CGCC
b <′<
−
−−
<< 11 22
1 )(
(10b)
when it exceeds the benchmark value of w. It should be remarked that the case of (8)
exceeding (7) describes a situation in which behavior alteration is greater for firms
than for banks ( 0→bm ) whereas the case of (8) being less than (7) is consistent with
the opposite alteration pattern ( 0→fm ).
The two-by-two Jacobian matrix connected with the vector field defining (3)
and (4),



−−−−−−−
−−−+−−−
bbb
fff
mbfmSbmSb
fmGfmGbCfm
))()(())((
))(())()((
1111
1111
211111
11211
has been used to assess asymptotic stability. Insofar as (10a) is concerned, multiplying
the first column by )( 12 1 −f , using (5) to substitute for )( 12 1 −fmf , and letting
0→bm  and 11 →f , yields the matrix



−−−
−−−−
)()(
)())((
111
1
211
11
bSbSb
mGGbCm ff
whose determinant is equal to ])()[( CbCGGbmS f ++−− 1
2
1 231 , with roots
GCGCGCG 32 /])([ −−±+  as in (10a) and hence, only )},(),,{( 11 101 bbh −=  is
asymptotically stable. This conclusion is depicted in Fig. 2(a). When the stakes for a
firm are relatively high from soft loans (G > 2C), the requests for such loans dominate
the scene, and it is "natural" that the regime should be discouraging them actively and
that the approval rates by banks should be very small, thus leading to a point like F in
Fig. 2(a). Next, insofar as (10b) is concerned, multiplying the second column by
)( 12 1 −b , using (6) to substitute for )( 12 1 −bmb , and letting 0→fm  and 11 →f ,
yields the matrix



−−−−−
−−
)]()[())((
)()(
1111
11
121111
12
bbmSbmSb
bGGbC
bb
whose determinant is equal to ]))[(( CCbbGCmS b +−−− 1
2
1 221 , with roots
)/(])([ GCCGCC −−± 2  as in (10b) and hence, only )},(),,{( 11 101 bbh −=  is stable. If
there is little to be gained from a soft loan (2C>G), firm behavior is expected to be
random, choosing each strategy with the same more or less likelihood and hence the
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regime should be discouraging soft loan approvals, thus leading to a point like B in Fig.
2(b).
What these considerations imply for the transition economies is, I think, quite
clear. The mixed economies could be interpreted to be currently at a point like B, with
hard budgets on the part of most firms and a policy emphasis on financial discipline.
But, transition economies should not be imitating the mixed ones. They should be
aiming at a point like F, struggling to undo the legacy of soft budgets and to promote a
financial order much stronger than that in the mixed economies. One might say that
point F rather than B should be targeted by the transition economies as a means of
keeping an eye on a would-be backsliding to the practices of the past. Simply, soft loan
requests and approvals will never cease to exist and are more likely to be exploited by
public corporations. This is why the equilibrium 1f  in Fig. 2 has been drawn near to
11 =f  despite the fact that theoretically we have 11 =f  exactly. Note, finally, that
transition has to happen. We have seen that there is no point in discussing the
interaction regime outside the set Φ , i.e. under a situation consistent with *h , as was
the case with central planning. Therefore, the abandonment of this form of economic
organization is a necessary condition for the removal of its softness. The "sufficient
condition" hinges upon issues like those just discussed. We refrain here from expanding
further on such issues, as this would not be motivated directly by the results of our
analysis. We shall do so, however, immediately in the next section.
Figure 2: Dynamics under behavior alteration
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The nature of our modeling and its results prompts a broader discussion of
central planning and the mixed economy than that emanating from the analysis. For
G. T. Soldatos / The Firm-Bank Interaction Regime and "Softness" 45
one thing, it leaves one with the impression that any change to the better within
central planning is doomed to failure. Just replace "Firm" by "Citizenry", "Soft-Hard" by
"Old-New", and the "Bank" by "Nomenklatura": The solution of the resulting game will
always be "Old-Approve", )( *h , once the payoff to "Old-Reject" is (0,0), i.e. once it is
painful for the nomenklatura to take the initiative to reject the old, its own fabrication
that made it in the first place to be nomenklatura and that makes it futile for the rest
to seek newness without a revolution. It is not surprising that little, if anything, was
achieved by the market reforms of the socialist countries of the past, as manifested by
the fact that all of them found themselves in the same position the moment transition
was launched regardless of their reform past.5 Hayek (1935, 1940) could have foreseen
such a state of affairs, because he grasped the essence of central planning more than
any practitioner of it or any ideological propagandist.
He, Mises (1949), and the Austrians might have argued, at the other extreme,
against any sort of government interference even in the face of policy success. But, the
same analytical apparatus (our own one) that gives them credit for their view on
central planning repudiates them when complete government dismissal is advocated.
Of course, replacing "Nomenklatura" by "Ordinary Government", we are led into the
realm of the mixed economy of the set Φ , thus confirming Hayek. Yet, were the
government to be "extraordinary", pervaded by zeal for successful interaction with its
citizens, prosperity and progress would be experienced. Certainly, the outcome of the
game is not a matter of semantics, of changing a player's name and particularly the
characterization of those in power; it is a matter of changing the quality of behavior
associated with the name change, (as in the case of the "Bank" in the analysis where,
however, characterizations were avoided).
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